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LIABILITY OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FOR




Financial institutions recently have faced numerous lawsuits for allegedly
aiding and abetting violations of the federal securities law. The authors hope
their proposed model will balance the rights and obligations of the respective
parties as well as the need for a consistent but fair approach based on economic
realities.
Liability for aiding and abetting arises from the knowing and substantial
assistance of the commission of a securities law violation., The action or
inaction of the secondary defendant (the aider and abettor) must have assisted
the primary violator's wrongdoing, and the secondary defendant must have
known of both the commission of the underlying violation and his own role
in the matter. 2 The aider's and abettor's assistance need not have caused the
plaintiff's loss but the assistance must have been substantial in order for a
court to impose liability.3
Aiding and abetting liability in the securities arena is a hybrid of statutory
basis and judicial imposition.4 This article will discuss the statutory basis for
aiding and abetting liability and the judicial action that has led to the
imposition of liability on financial institutions in civil actions for damages.'
I. DISTINCTION OF AIDING AND ABETTING
LIABILITY FROM OTHER FORMS OF
SECURITIES LAW LIABILITY
A. Distinction between Primary and Secondary Liability
Primary and secondary liability must be distinguished to understand fully
the scope of, and policy and reasoning behind, secondary liability. Primary
* Hunton & Williams, Raleigh, North Carolina; member of North Carolina Bar.
** Hunton & Williams, Raleigh, North Carolina; member of North Carolina, Virginia
and Texas Bars.
1. See generally Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975); Brennan v.
Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
2. See generally Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975); Brennan v.
Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
3. Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 162-71 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
4. Neither the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act") nor the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") specifically provide for aiding and abetting liability but 18
U.S.C. § 2(a) (1982) provides that an aider and abettor of a violation of federal law is punishable
as a principal.
5. Id. See, e.g., Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D.
811
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liability arises from the alleged wrongdoer's direct violation of a duty owed
to the investing public under the securities laws. Secondary liability (of which
aiding and abetting is one type) arises from the secondary defendant's
involvement with another wrongdoer's direct violation rather than from a
direct securities law violation by the secondary defendant. The doctrine of
secondary liability holds a defendant liable to the same extent as the primary
wrongdoer. In criminal law terms, the aider and abettor, as a person found
secondarily liable, is "punishable as a principal.
' 6
The recent development of the "fraud on the market" theory is an
expansion of primary liability and is distinct from aiding and abetting
liability. A hypothetical example is helpful. Assume that the president of
ABC Corporation issues a press release to shareholders which includes a
material overstatement of the corporation's net income for the year. At the
same time, an investor decides to purchase shares of ABC Corporation's
common stock because he hears that the corporation has just landed a long-
term government contract. When the actual net income is released, the value
of the stock falls substantially and the investor now wants to sue the
corporation and the president. Under a conservative legal approach, the
investor will encounter difficulty in establishing reliance upon the misstated
financial information in the press release. The investor had not read the
release and did not purchase the stock on that basis. Under the fraud on the
market theory, however, the investor may be able to establish causation. The
fact that the press release inflated the market value of the stock at the time
of the investor's purchase would be decisive. Courts adopting the fraud on
the market theory view the misrepresentation as the actual cause of the
plaintiff's loss. These courts do not require that the misrepresentation be a
factor in the plaintiff's decision to purchase the security but instead require
that the misrepresentation be a factor in the artificial inflation of the
security's value.
Aiding and abetting liability would arise in this hypothetical situation
only if a third party aids and abets the president's actions. The fraud on the
market theory does not extend liability to additional persons but instead
expands the concept of the principal violations that a secondary defendant
can aid or abet. For example, if a newspaper publisher knew that ABC
Corporation's net income was overstated but published that information
anyway, the publisher may be liable for aiding and abetting the president's
actions under this theory.
B. Distinction between Various Forms of
Secondary Liability
Several forms of secondary liability exist which are different from aiding
Ind. 1966), aff'd 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); see also
Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy,
In Pari Delicto, Indemnification and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597 (1972).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1982). See infra notes 29-35 infra and accompanying text (discussing
history of aiding and abetting liability).
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and abetting liability: 1) liability as a "controlling person" under Section 15
of the Securities Act' or Section 20 of the Exchange Act;' 2) liability under
the doctrine of respondeat superior or an agency theory;9 and 3) liability for
conspiracy to commit a securities law violation. 0 The first form of secondary
liability arises under the specific terms of the statute but the other two forms
have been imposed judicially." Although this article addresses only potential
aiding and abetting liability, the other forms of secondary liability will be
summarily discussed to provide the necessary framework within which the
securities laws operate.
1. Liability as a Controlling Person
Section 15 of the Securities Act imposes liability on "controlling persons"
for the acts of persons over whom they have control unless the controlling
person has no reason to know of the facts giving rise to the liability of the
controlled person.' 2 This Section 15 "no reason to believe" standard which
prevents imposition of liability on the secondary defendant contrasts with
the "knowing and substantial assistance" standard which imposes liability
on the aider and abettor.' 3 A defendant can more easily escape liability under
the Section 15 standard than under the standard for aiding and abetting. As
a consequence, most plaintiffs allege aiding and abetting the underlying
violation either instead of, or in addition to, controlling person liability
under Section 15.
Section 20 of the Exchange Act is very similar to Section 15 of the
Securities Act.' 4 In slight contrast, however, Section 20 allows a defense if
7. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1976); see infra notes 12-18 and accompanying text (discussing
controlling person liability).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1982).
9. See infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
11. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 770 and 78t (1976) (only controlling person liability is specifically
authorized by statute).
12. See 15 U.S.C. § 770 (1982). Section 15 of the Securities Act provides:
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, or who,
pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or understanding with one or more
other persons by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, controls any
person liable under [sections 11 or 12], shall also be liable jointly and severally with
and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such
controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person had no knowledge of or
reasonable ground to believe in the existence of facts by reason of which the liability
of the controlled person is alleged to exist.
What constitutes control over the violator within the meaning of this statute is a factual
question. See Ferrara & Sanger, Derivative Liability in Securities Law: Controlling Person
Liability; Respondeat Superior, and Aiding and Abetting, 40 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 1007, 1009-
11 (1983) (overview of control standard).
13. See infra notes 121-79 and accompanying text (knowing and substantial assistance of
a securities law violation is basic element of aiding and abetting cause of action).
14. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1982). Section 20 of the Exchange Act provides:
(a) Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any
1985]
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the controlling person "acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly
induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action. '"'5 This
defense is even less difficult to establish than the "no reason to believe"
defense of Section 15 of the Securities Act. Plaintiffs' preference for aiding
and abetting actions rather than "controlling person" actions is true not-
withstanding that Sections 15 and 20 both place the burden of proof on the
defendant whereas the burden of proof in an aiding and abetting cause of
action is on the plaintiff. 6 In most cases involving violations of the Exchange
Act, however, knowledgeable plaintiffs will seek actions under Section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act rather than under Section 20.
Most courts have rejected the argument that Sections 15 and 20 are the
exclusive provisions under which alleged aiders and abettors may be reached
although the argument has been the source of much commentary.' Some
courts do, however, use these sections as indicators of the limited nature of
the securities laws in response to the everlasting attempt by plaintiffs to
broaden the scope of the securities laws.'5
provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable
jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any
person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person acted
in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the
violation or cause of action.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to do any act or
thing which it would be unlawful for such person to do under the provisions of this
chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder through or by means of any other
person.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any director or officer of, or any owner of securities
issued by, any issuer required to file any document, report, or information under this
chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder without just cause to hinder, delay, or
obstruct the making or filing of any such document, report, or information.
Id.
15. Id. The relationships constituting control under the Exchange Act are similar to those
constituting control under the Securities Act. See supra note 13. Herm v. Stafford, 663 F.2d
669 (6th Cir. 1981) (examination of control under Exchange Act regarding director of corpo-
ration).
16. See Ruder, supra note 5, at 602.
17. The fact that the same circumstances often give rise to both allegations under the
controlling person provisions and allegations of other secondary liability is a basis for the
argument that Sections 15 and 20 should be the exclusive remedies against secondary defendants.
Although this argument has met with some agreement from the courts with regard to actions
under the doctrine of respondeat superior, conspiracy and aiding and abetting cases abound.
See Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975); Burks
v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979) (not all existing state law is replaced by the federal securities
laws); see also Ferrara & Sanger, supra note 12, at 1017-22; Fischel, Secondary Liability under
Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, 69 CAL. L. REv. 80 (1981); Ruder, supra note 5.
18. This has been the approach of the Third and Ninth Circuits. See, e.g., Rochez
Brothers Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976); Zweig
v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975); cf. Sharp v.





The doctrine of respondeat superior has been invoked in the securities
context against employers and certain other principals for unlawful acts of
their employees or agents. An employer, for example, may be liable for
actions taken by his employee acting within the scope of his or her employ-
ment, or a principal may be liable for actions taken by an agent acting
within the scope of his actual or apparent authority.' 9 In contrast with
controlling person liability, the doctrine of respondeat superior is not based
upon the employer's or principal's failure to supervise its employee or agent.
20
Thus, the defenses of due diligence and good faith are unavailable. 21 Res-
pondeat superior is a form of strict liability of the employer or principal and
so plaintiffs favor this doctrine over actions under the controlling person
sections of the securities statutes. Respondeat superior is even favored over
causes of action based on aiding and abetting, but its limitations in particular
employer and principal situations results in the doctrine's comparatively
infrequent use.
3. Conspiracy
Under a conspiracy theory, a defendant is liable if he agrees with another
to commit a securities violation and some overt act in furtherance of the
violation is taken. 22 A conspiracy is the agreement of two or more persons
to accomplish an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means. 23
By contrast, aiding and abetting involves the assistance to a primary violator
in the violator's accomplishment of either an unlawful purpose or a lawful
purpose by unlawful means. The distinction is that conspiracy requires an
agreement. As the Supreme Court succinctly stated in a tax evasion case:
The gist of the conspiracy is the agreement; that of aiding, abetting
or counseling is in consciously advising or assisting another to
commit particular offenses, and thus becoming a party to them; that
of substantive crime, going a step beyond mere aiding, abetting,
counseling to completion of the offense.
24
Conspiracy theory is often confused with aiding and abetting theory.
25
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 219, 257, 261 (1958); see Ferrara & Sanger, supra
note 12, at 1015-1022.
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 219, 257, 261 (1958); 3 Am. JUR. 2D Agency
§ 261 (1962).
21. See supra note 20.
22. See Fischel, supra note 17; Ruder, supra note 5; R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 527-34
(3d ed. 1982).
23. R. PERKINS, supra note 22, at 528.
24. Pinkerton v. U.S., 328 U.S. 640, 649 (1946).
25. Both conspiracy and aiding and abetting require cooperation in an unlawful scheme.
Conspiracy, however, requires an agreement whereas aiding and abetting requires knowing And
substantial assistance. The distinctions in particular situations can be difficult to determine but
the differences are important, particularly for pleading purposes. This is especially true in
1985]
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Especially in cases in which the defendant's conduct is more culpable,
plaintiffs allege both conspiracy and aiding and abetting. The confusion of
the two theories stems from the specific statutory language prohibiting
unlawful fraudulent schemes, particularly in Section 10(b) cases. The direct
involvement of a participant in an unlawful scheme should give rise to a
conspiracy action, whereas aiding and abetting liability should arise from
the assistance given by a secondary party to a direct participant. Because
courts will not impose aiding and abetting liability unless the defendant
knows of his role in the overall improper conduct, 26 the alleged aider and
abettor will be fairly culpable. Whether this culpability rises to the level of
conspiracy is an issue not fully examined in most cases. Perhaps courts
recognize the potential procedural and practical problems created by attempt-
ing to draw this fine line and see no reason to confront the question. In
most situations where the issue may arise the defendant's actions generally
at least constitute aiding and abetting and so the defendant will be liable to
the plaintiff regardless of the underlying rationale.
II. AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY EXPLAINED
Aiding and abetting a securities law violation entails the knowing and
substantial assistance of another's commission of a securities law violation.
Unlike the provision of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 which specifi-
cally prohibits aiding, abetting, counseling, commanding, inducing or pro-
curing a violation of that act and authorizes the federal courts to enjoin
such actions, 27 neither the Securities Act nor the Exchange Act specifically
address aiding and abetting. Both acts impose liability on persons controlling
the violator 21 but neither authorize either an injunctive procedure or a private
action for damages by an injured investor against an aider and abettor.
A. History
Title 18, Section 2(a) of the United States Code states that "[w]hoever
commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels,
commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a princi-
pal." 29 This section has been used in connection with injunctive procedures
brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC). a0 The
securities fraud cases because fraud must be pleaded with particularity. FED. R. Civ. PRo. 9(b).
26. See infra notes 102-120 and 166-79 and accompanying text (knowledge of both the
underlying violation and the actor's role in the scheme is necessary).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(e) (1982).
28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77o & 78t (1982).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1982). See Note, Secondary Liability of Attorneys for Securities
Law Violations-The Need for a Single Standard of Attorney Conduct, 30 WAYNE L. REv 65
(1983).
30. SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); SEC v. Timetrust,




language of Section 2(a) is directed at criminal violations and speaks in terms
of punishment. Courts have granted injunctions against aiders and abettorsa"
and presumably will impose criminal penalties for a violation of such
injunctions. Section 2(a) of Title 12, however, is far from binding authority
for allowing a private action against aiders and abettors for damages.
In 1959, Congress considered and rejected an amendment to the securities
acts specifically drafted to include aiding and abetting as a direct violation
of those acts.32 One of the stated purposes of the bill was "to strengthen
and clarify the injunctive power" rather than to add a new element to the
power of the SEC.3 3 Notwithstanding this defeat, courts still allow private
actions. 34 Although the amendment was only one of many amendments
offered by the SEC, its defeat is the only statement of Congressional intent
in this area.
31
In the landmark case of Timetrust, Inc. v. SEC,3 6 the district court
issued an injunction against various defendants participating in an unlawful
distribution of stock, including certain salesmen and others who allegedly
aided and abetted this distribution.3 7 The court of appeals reversed a portion
of the case on the evidence presented but the theory of aiding and abetting
remained intact.3 In SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co., Inc.,39 the district court
found for the SEC on a conspiracy theory in an injunctive proceeding.
One of the more important early cases was Brennan v. Midwestern
United Life Insurance Co.40 In Brennan, the district court rejected the
31. SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); SEC v. Timetrust,
Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 1939), rev'd in part on other grounds, 142 F.2d 744 (9th Cir.
1944).
32. See Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 275-76 (1959); Hearings Before the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 93, 103 (1959). See also S. REP. No.
1757, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1960).
33. See S. REP. No. 1757, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1960).
34. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966),
aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
35. It should be noted that SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co., Fry v. Schumacker, and SEC v.
Timetrust, Inc. had already been decided at the time Congress defeated the amendment that
would have included aiding and abetting as a direct violation of the securities laws. SEC v.
Scott Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Fry v. Schumacker, 83 F. Supp. 476
(E.D. Pa. 1947); SEC v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 1939), rev'd in part, 142
F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1944). Both Scott Taylor and Timetrust, however, were injunctive proceedings
by the SEC and neither involved private civil actions. See infra text accompanying notes 36-39
(discussing Scott Taylor and Timetrust). In addition, the proposed but unadopted Federal
Securities Code includes a section specifically prohibiting aiding or abetting a violation of that
code. ALI, Federal Securities Code § 1724(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1978). See generally
Comment, Attorneys and Participant Liability under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933,
1982 ARiz. ST. L. J. 529.
36. 28 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 1939), rev'd in part, 142 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1944).
37. Id.
38. Timetrust v. SEC, 142 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1944).
39. 183 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
40. 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 989 (1970).
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argument that the failure of the bill which included aiding and abetting as a
direct violation necessarily negates the existence of aiding and abetting
liability. 41 In Brennan, the court allowed a private action against the issuer
of securities who allegedly aided and abetted a broker-dealer's violation of
Section 10(b) by advising persons who complained of the broker-dealer's
actions to settle the matter directly with the broker-dealer. The issuer of
securities also failed to report the broker-dealer to the Indiana Securities
Commission and the SEC after the issuer received the complaints. The court
cited with approval Restatement of Torts Section 876 which deals with harm
resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of persons acting in
concert. 42 The Brennan court approved of the abolition in Section 876 of
any privity requirement that may have existed prior to the drafting of that
section.43
The importance of Brennan stems from the Seventh Circuit's approval
of the aiding and abetting action in fairly broad terms. The court of appeals
stated that but for the encouragement by the issuer of the securities, the
broker-dealer would have ceased his violations or would have been forced to
do so by the Indiana Securities Commission or the SEC.Y One judge wrote
a vituperative dissent on the lack of evidence but agreed as to the plaintiff's
ability to recover on an aiding and abetting theory.
45
From this leading case, many others followed. In Landy v. FDIC,4 6 the
Third Circuit set forth three elements to establish liability: (1) an independent
wrong must exist; (2) the aider or abettor must know of that wrong's
existence; and (3) substantial assistance must be given in effecting that
wrong. 4
41. See S. REP. No. 1757, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960) (bill was comprehensive package
of amendments for both Securities Act and Exchange Act). The Brennan court noted that three
cases had already decided this issue, SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y.
1959); Fry v. Schumacher, 83 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Pa. 1947); Timetrust, Inc. v. SEC, 28 F. Supp.
34 (N.D. Cal. 1939), rev'd in part on other grounds, 142 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1944), and that
other amendments were offered in the bill as well. The bill was a comprehensive package of
amendments for both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. See S. REP. No. 1757, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1960).
42. 259 F. Supp. at 680. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 876 provides:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, a
person is liable if he
(a) orders or induces such conduct, knowing of the conditions under which the act
is done or intending the consequences which ensue, or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial
assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his
own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third
person.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 876 (1939).
43. 259 F. Supp. at 680.
44. 417 F.2d at 153-155.
45. See id. at 155 (Judge Morgan stated he would concur in decision if he could find any
evidence to support it).
46. 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974). See infra notes 120-
23 and accompanying text (discussing Landy).
47. Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960
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In Woodward v. Metro Bank,48 the court of appeals further refined the
elements of the cause of action. In this case, plaintiff co-signed a promissory
note pledging certain stock as collateral "against all indebtedness now owing
or which may hereafter become owing" by the debtor to the defendant bank.
The plaintiff believed that the debtor was a corporation but the loan was
actually made to one of the corporation's officers who in turn deposited the
loan proceeds in the corporation's account. The bank sought payment from
the plaintiff when the officer defaulted on subsequent indebtedness. The
Fifth Circuit rejected the Landy court's requirement of the existence of an
independent wrong in favor of the existence of an underlying securities
violation to ensure a sufficient nexus with the securities laws. 49 The Wood-
ward court also rejected the Landy requirement of the aider's and abettor's
knowledge of the wrong's existence in favor of a general awareness of one's
role in an overall improper activity." In Woodward, the district court
dismissed the suit because the bank's loan was not a "sale" within the
meaning of the Exchange Act and the loan was exempted under Section
3(a)(10) as short-term commercial paper." The court of appeals affirmed but
on different grounds. The Fifth Circuit's decision was based on the lack of
any substantial assistance by the alleged aiders and abettors in the primary
Section 10(b) violations.
B. Elements of Aiding and Abetting a Securities
Law Violation
To recapitulate, aiding and abetting liability is a form of secondary
liability separate and distinct from liability for the underlying violation.
Although courts vary in their articulation of the elements of aiding and
abetting liability, generally the following three elements must be present: (1)
an underlying securities law violation by a third party; (2) the defendant's
knowledge of that underlying violation; and (3) the defendant's knowing and
substantial assistance in the third party's commission of the underlying
violation.52
1. Underlying Violation
The first element, the underlying violation, caused much confusion in
(1974).
48. 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975).
49. Id. at 86-87.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 86-87. Section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act provides an exemption for notes
with a maturity of nine months or less. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(aX1O) (1982). The distict court's opinion
is unpublished.
52. The elements of aiding and abetting liability are the compilation of a number of
different cases. Harmsen v. Smith, 693 F.2d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
822 (1983); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 92 (5th Cir. 1975); Landy v. FDIC, 486
F.2d 139, 163-65 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); H.L. Federman & Co. v.
Greenberg, 405 F. Supp. 1332, 1336-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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the early aiding and abetting cases.53 The courts often failed to distinguish
primary from secondary violations 4 and also failed to distinguish among the
various forms of secondary liability.55 The more recent decisions emphasize
the necessity of a principal underlying violation that the defendant could
have aided and abetted.
5 6
The underlying violation may be any violation of the Securities Act or
the Exchange Act.5 7 Because the bulk of the cases have arisen under Sections
1258 and 1719 of the Securities Act and Section 10 of the Exchange Act,
6
0
these are the only sections that will be discussed at any length herein. 6'
53. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (confusion regarding requirement of
underlying violation may have arisen in part due to statutory language of Section 10(b) of
Exchange Act prohibiting certain fraudulent schemes). The causation requirement probably also
contributed to the confusion in the early aiding and abetting cases. The aider's and abettor's
conduct need not have been a cause of the plaintiff's loss but the aider's and abettor's conduct
must have aided the primary violator's unlawful conduct. The primary violator's actions must
have been a cause of the loss. See Rosen v. Dick, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) 94,786 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); see also infra notes 118-64 and accompanying text
(discussing knowing and substantial assistance element).
54. See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978). In Rolf, where plaintiff's registered representative was held liable
for aiding and abetting the plaintiff's investment adviser's misconduct. Id. The Roif court
applied Woodward's three-pronged analysis of aiding and abetting liability but also used such
language as "[the defendant] participated in and lent assistance to the fraud." Id. at 44
(emphasis added).
55. See, e.g., Pettit v. American Stock Exchange, 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). In
Pettit, the court decided the case on a conspiracy theory but cited SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co.
as support for liability for the knowing assistance or participation in an unlawful scheme under
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. Id.; SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp. 909, 909 n.12
(S.D.N.Y. 1959). The footnote cited, however, only referred to aiding and abetting liability.
See 183 F. Supp. at 909 n.12.
56. See, e.g., Cleary v. Perfectune, 700 F.2d 774 (1st Cir. 1983); lIT v. Cornfeld, 619
F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1974).
57. The underlying violation which supports aiding and abetting liability may also be a
violation of another act or a stock exchange rule. See Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co.,
570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978). This article, however, is concerned only with violations of these
two acts. Violations under other acts such as the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 are not considered
here. In addition, only sections under which a private cause of action for a primary violation
is allowed justify a private action against a secondary defendant. Thus there would be no
liability for aiding and abetting under the antifraud provisions of the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940, since there is no private federal cause of action under that statute. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6
(1982). See Transamerica Mortgage Advisers v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19-24 (1979).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982). See infra notes 62-85 and accompanying text (discussing
aiding and abetting cases under Section 12 of Securities Act).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1982). See infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text (discussing
aiding and abetting cases under Section 17 of Securities Act).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 82 (1982). See infra notes 92-101 and accompanying text (discussing
aiding and abetting cases under Section 10 of Exchange Act).
61. Private actions are also granted under other sections of the securities acts other than
Sections 12 and 17 of the Securities Act and Section 10 of the Exchange Act. See, e.g., In re
Caesar's Palace Sec. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Caesar's Palace dealt with aiding
and abetting liability under Section 11 of the Securities Act but this case was overruled in In re
Flight Transportation Corporation Securities Litigation in light of the Supreme Court's decision
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a. Section 12 of the Securities Act
Technically Section 12 of the Securities Act only grants the purchaser a
right of rescission of his purchase, or an action for damages if the purchaser
has sold his security, against the seller if the security in question was offered
or sold in violation of Section 562 or pursuant to a false or misleading
prospectus. 63 By the specific terms of this section, no secondary liability is
in Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean. [1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,622
(D. Minn. 1984); Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. 375 (1983) (stating that Section
11 actions may' only be brought against parties specifically set forth in the statute). Section 11
sets forth very specific remedies against very specific parties and several courts have held that
no private action for aiding and abetting a violation of that section exists. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k
(1982); In re Flight Transportation Corp. Sec. Litig. [1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 91,622 (D. Minn. 1984); Hagert v. Glickman, Lurie, Eiger & Co., 520 F. Supp. 1028
(D. Minn. 1981); In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Sec. Litig., 416 F. Supp. 161, 181 (C.D.
Cal. 1976). But see SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982) (SEC injunctive
proceeding). The plaintiff in Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman sought an action under New York Stock
Exchange Rule 405 ("Know Thy Customer Rule" requiring that securities purchased based on
broker-dealers' investment advice be suitable for the customer) but the Second Circuit did not
reach the issue. Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1039 (1978). Courts have rejected private aiding and abetting actions under Section 15
of the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1982). See, e.g., SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301,
1313-14 (9th Cir. 1982) (private action against accountants for allegedly aiding and abetting a
violation of Section 15 are specifically prohibited).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982). Section 5 of the Securities Act prohibits "gun-jumping" in
the sale of a security and imposes certain other requirements in the offer or sale of a security.
Section 5 provides:
(a) Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be unlawful
for any person, directly or indirectly
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security through the use
or medium of any prospectus or otherwise; or
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce,
by any means or instruments of transportation, any such security for the
purpose of sale or for delivery after sale.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or of the mails to carry or transmit any prospectus
relating to any security with respect to which a registration statement has
been filed under this subchapter, unless such prospectus meets the require-
ments of section 77j of this title; or
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to make use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce
or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium of any
prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has been filed
as to such security, or while the registration statement is the subject of a refusal
order or stop order or (prior to the effective date of the registration statement)
any public proceeding or examination under section 77h of this title.
15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982). Section 12 provides:
Any person who-
(1) offers or sells a security in violation of Section [5] of this title, or
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imposed, and privity is required. Notwithstanding the section's legislative
history, some courts have judicially imposed secondary liability under one
of two theories. The first theory is an expanded concept of the meaning of
seller under this section. 64 The second theory imposes aiding and abetting
liability on defendants other than the actual seller.65 Both approaches,
although perhaps consistent with the overall policy of the securities acts, are
contrary to both the language and legislative history of Section 12.
The Fifth Circuit has adopted an expanded reading of the term "seller"
under Section 12 of the Securities Act, examining whether the defendant was
a proximate cause or substantial factor in causing the transaction to occur.6
In Pharo v. Smith,67 the Fifth Circuit stated that "in complex securities
transactions, the true seller is not necessarily the person who transfers title,
so other participants in the sale can, also, be treated as sellers. ' 6 The court
distinguished between a strict privity requirement and an overbroad partici-
pation theory and viewed its approach as a middle ground.
69
In addition, the Pharo court distinguished between subsections (1) and
(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provisions of
Section (2) of Subsection (a) of said section), by the use of any means or
instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or
of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes
an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of
such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof
that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known, of such untruth or omission,
shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either
at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration
paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received
thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the
security.
15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982).
64. Section 12 only grants an action against the seller of a security. 15 U.S.C. § 771
(1982). The operative phrase in Section 12 states that the violator ". . . shall be liable to the
person purchasing such security from him .. " Id. Expanding the meaning of this phrase
imposes primary, not secondary, liability on others than the true seller. See Comment, supra
note 35.
65. See infra text accompanying notes 78-79 (imposition of aiding and abetting liability
on persons other than seller is form of secondary liability).
66. Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on rehearing,
625 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1980); see also Comment, supra note 35.
67. 621 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on rehearing, 625 F.2d 1226
(5th Cir. 1980).
68. 621 F.2d at 665.
69. Id. at 665-67. In Wonneman v. Stratford Sec. Co., the court required privity between the
plaintiff and the seller and rejected plaintiff's theory that defendant's participation in the overall
plan to market securities was sufficient to impose liability under Section 12(1). [1957-1961
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,034 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). Wonneman, however, was
decided before private actions under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act were allowed. Whether
the Wonneman rationale would be followed today in the Second Circuit is unclear.
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(2) of Section 12.70 Subsection 12(1) imposes strict liability for the sale of an
unregistered security but subsection 12(2) allows a defense if the seller did
not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of
the violation. 71 In subsection 12(1) cases, the court said it would be more
unwilling to impose liability on one who is not the true seller. With this
approach, a seller can be anyone who is in privity with the purchaser or who
is a substantial factor in causing the transaction to occur.
The Eighth Circuit has examined the relationship of the defendant to
the particular transaction in determining whether the defendant is a seller
under Section 12.72 Technically such an analysis is appropriate for secondary
liability but not for primary liability. 73 The result is the same, however, in
that liability is imposed on a party who is not the actual seller and primary
violator. The actual seller and primary violator would also generally be reach-
able under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.74
The Eighth Circuit's approach seems clearly contrary to the language of
the statute. Section 12 allows a right of rescission against the seller, or an
action for damages if theplaintiff no longer owns the security, if there is an
offer or sale of a security through the use of a misleading prospectus or in
violation of Section 5.75 The language is extremely narrow in contrast to the
sweeping language of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. 76 In addition, in
recent decisions the Supreme Court has indicated the importance of adhering
70. See supra note 63 (statutory language of Section 12).
71. Id.
72. See Wasson v. SEC, 558 F.2d 879, 886 (8th Cir. 1977). The Eighth Circuit stated that
the key question was whether the defendant was in a unique position to ask relevant questions,
acquire material information or disclose his findings. Id. The defendant's involvement in the
transaction was only one of the factors that the court considered. Id. at 886-87.
73. The defendant's relationship to the transaction is a factor similar to the knowing and
substantial assistance element of aiding and abetting liability. It examines the defendant's
position in the transaction and not whether the defendant committed a primary violation.
74. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). See infra notes 92-101 and accompanying text (discus-
sion of Section 10(b)).
75. See 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982), supra note 63 (text of Section 12 of Securities Act); 15
U.S.C. § 77e (1982); supra note 62 (Section 5 of Securities Act).
76. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982). Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange-
(a) To effect a short sale, or to use or employ any stop-loss order in connection with
the purchase or sale, of any security registered on a national securities exchange,
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act refers generally to manipulative or deceptive practices in
connection with the sale of a security, while Section 12 of the Securities Act refers to an offer
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to the actual language of the statute and has been unwilling to embrace
expansive liability."
A second theory of secondary liability is used by courts that do riot
define expansively the term "seller" in Section 12 of the Securities Act. This
second approach involves the application of aiding and abetting liability to
defendants other than the true seller in Section 12 cases. 78 The basic theory
is that aiders and abettors should be liable to plaintiffs under Section 12 to
the same extent as the seller is liable.79 As in all aiding and abetting cases,
the three elements of aiding and abetting discussed above must be present
before liability is imposed.80 In Tucker v. Janota,8' for example, the district
court examined the role of two banks which loaned money for investors to
invest in various real estate limited partnerships. The Tucker court considered
the defendants' behavior with regard to possible aiding and abetting viola-
tions of Sections 12(1) and (2) of the Securities Act and Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act. The court held that a triable issue of fact existed under
Section 12 as well as under Section 10(b). This approach, however, is also
contrary to the section's language and legislative history.
As discussed above, Section 12 is a narrow remedy allowing recovery of
the consideration paid or damages if the purchaser no longer owns the
security. 82 This language implies recovery from the party to whom the
consideration was paid, not recovery from any other party to the transaction.
This section is unlike Section 11 which in general terms allows recovery of
the difference between the amount paid for the security and its market
value.83 A Section 1 1 measure of damages is more closely akin to the measure
or sale of a security by the use of a misleading prospectus or oral communication or in violation
of Section 5. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982).
77. See infra text accompanying notes 181-88.
78. Tucker v. Janota, [1979 Transfer Binder] FEo. SEc. L. RaP. (CCH) 96,701 (N.D.
Ill. 1978). Under cases following this approach, the defendant is not treated as a seller but as
a secondary defendant. This approach thus applies secondary liability analysis instead of the
primary liability analysis discussed above. See supra text accompanying notes 66-74.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31 and 46-51 (discussion of history and necessary
elements of aiding and abetting).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 46-51.
81. [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,701 (N.D. I1. 1978). See infra
text accompanying notes 155-56 (discussing Tucker v. Janota).
82. See 3 A. BROMBERO, SEcuRITIEs LAW § 8.4(310) (1981). Professor Bromberg has
argued that Section 12 imposes liability but does not define a violation and that aiding and
abetting is criminal in nature, connoting a separate violation. Id.
83. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1982) (Section 11(e) of Securities Act). Section 11(e) of the
Securities Act provides:
The suit authorized under subsection (a) of this section may be to recover such
damages as shall represent the difference between the amount paid for the security
(not exceeding the price at which the security was offered to the public) and (1) the
value thereof as of the time such suit was brought, or (2) the price at which such
security shall have been disposed of in the market before suit, or (3) the price at
which such security shall have been disposed of after suit but before judgment if such
damages shall be less than the damages representing the difference between the
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of damages caused by an aider and abettor. The Section 12 rescissional
measure of damages is the measure of damages one should recover from the
seller of the security. It is difficult to imagine a situation where one can
"recover the consideration paid" from one to whom no consideration was
paid.
Aiding and abetting liability under Section 12 is also contrary to the
section's legislative history. In 1960, Congress defeated a proposed amend-
ment specifically drafted to include aiding and abetting as a direct violation
of Section 12(2). 84 Although one should not read too much into such a
defeat, the fact remains that Congress failed to enact such an amendment.
The narrow remedy authorized and the failure of enactment in 1960 with no
further attempt at enactment implies that secondary liability was not intended
by Congress to be encompassed within the plain meaning of Section 12.85
b. Section 17 of the Securities Act
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act prohibits, in the offer or sale of a
security, the employment of any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, the
obtaining of money through the use of an untrue statement, the omission of
a material fact which renders statements in the offering or sale misleading,
and the use of a practice which may operate as a fraud or deceit upon the
purchaser. 86 No scienter is required for a primary violation under subpara-
amount paid for the security (not exceeding the price at which the security was offered
to the public) and the value thereof as of the time such suit was brought: Provided,
That if the defendant proves that any portion or all of such damages represents other
than the depreciation in value of such security resulting from such part of the
registration statement with respect to which his liability is asserted, not being true or
omitting to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make
the statements therein not misleading, such portion of or all such damages shall not
be recoverable. In no event shall any underwriter (unless such underwriter shall have
knowingly received from the issuer for acting as an underwriter some benefit, directly
or indirectly, in which all other underwriters similarly situated did not share in
proportion to their respective interests in the underwriting) be liable in any suit or as
a consequence of suits authorized under subsection (a) of this section for damages in
excess of the total price at which the securities underwritten by him and distributed
to the public were offered to the public.
Id.
84. See Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 275-76 (1959); Hearings Before the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 93,103 (1959). See also S. REP. No.
1757, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1960).
85. Principles of statutory construction dictate that the meaning of a statute should be
gleaned from its plain meaning in its context. Only if the plain meaning of a statute is in
question should a court need to refer to its legislative history. This is often referred to as the
"plain meaning rule." United States v. American Trucking Assoc., 310 U.S. 534 (1940).
86. See 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1982). Section 17 of the Securities Act provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the
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graphs (a)(2) or (a)(3) but scienter is necessary in an aiding and abetting
action.Y
Although Section 17(a) is phrased similarly to Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act, considerable controversy exists concerning whether the courts
will allow a private cause of action under Section 17(a).88 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has twice reserved decisions on whether Section 17(a) affords a private
remedy.89 Because much has been written about this issue, this article does
not attempt to address this question. Most actions under Section 17(a) are
also actionable under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and therefore most
decisions under Section 17(a) rest on alternative theories. 9° Courts which
allow a private action under Section 17(a) in all probability will also allow
an action for aiding and abetting a violation of Section 17(a). 9'
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the
mails, to publish, give publicity to, or circulate any notice, circular, advertisement,
newspaper, article, letter, investment service, or communication which, though
not purporting to offer a security for sale, describes such security for a consid-
eration received or to be received, directly or indirectly, from an issuer, under-
writer, or dealer, without fully disclosing the receipt, whether past or prospective,
of such consideration and the amount thereof.
Id.
87. See infra notes 102-20 and 166-79 and accompanying text.
88. Compare Landry v. All American Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982)
(Section 17(a) of Securities Act affords no private cause of action) with Berger v. Bishop
Investment Corp., 695 F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1982) (permitting private cause of action); Stephenson
v. Calpine Conifers II, Ltd., 652 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1981) (same); Kirshner v. U.S., 603 F.2d
234 (2d Cir. 1978) (same). See also L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1148-51
(arguing no private cause of action exists).
89. Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. 375, 378 n.2 (1983); Teamsters v.
Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 557 n.9 (1979).
90. The reason that the Supreme Court has been able to reserve decisions on the issue in
the cases cited in note 89 supra is that most actions under Section 17(a) of the Securities Act
are also actionable under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. Scienter is necessary, however, in
an action under Section 10(b). Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
91. See SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 304 (6th Cir. 1974); Timetrust, Inc. v. SEC, 142 F.2d
744 (9th Cir. 1944) (examples of injunctive proceedings for aiding and abetting under Section
17). As discussed herein, the doctrine of liability for aiding and abetting developed independently
of any particular section of the securities acts. Given the language of Section 17, no distinction
should be drawn between actions under Section 17 and actions under other similar antifraud
sections of the securities acts.
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c. Section lO(b) of the Exchange Act
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act 92 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder93 are the provisions under which the great majority of aiding and
abetting liability cases arise.Y Generally, Rule 10b-5 prohibits the use or
employment, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security, of any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance. Unlike Section 12 of the
Securities Act which restricts damages to a rescissional measure, Section
10(b) allows recovery for fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security. The "in connection with" standard, although certainly not unlim-
ited, allows for recovery from persons other than the actual seller. 95 The
imposition of liability for aiding and abetting a Section 10(b) violation
effectively expands the scope of the section even further. Notwithstanding
this expansion of primary liability, courts also allow recovery from aiders and
abettors.96
Courts now require scienter of the primary violator before imposing
direct liability.97 Assuming a plaintiff establishes a primary violation with
the requisite scienter, the court may impose aiding and abetting liability if
the plaintiff establishes the secondary defendant's knowledge of the under-
92. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
93. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975). Rule lOb-5 of the Exchange Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
94. The broad language of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule lob-5 is conducive
to litigation. Examples are Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774 (Ist Cir. 1983); Harmsen
v. Smith, 693 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822 (1983); SEC v. Seaboard Corp.,
677 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982); Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1981); Monsen v. Con-
solidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1978); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d
84 (5th Cir. 1975); Gaimes, Hooper & Messer, Inc. v. Pierce, 519 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1975); Brennan
v. Midwestern United Life Ins., Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147
(7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970). See also infra note 180-88 and accompanying text.
95. The fraud committed must be "in connection with" the purchase or sale of a security.
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
96. Harmsen v. Smith, 693 F.2d 932, 944 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822 (1983).
97. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). In Hochfelder, the Supreme Court
dismissed an action against an accounting firm for allegedly aiding and abetting the fraud of
an employee of a brokerage firm by negligently failing to discover the fraud during the
accountants' audit of the brokerage firm. The Court held that proof of scienter is a necessary
element of a cause of action under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 but reserved the issue whether
reckless conduct satisfies the scienter requirement. Most courts now hold that recklessness is
sufficient. See, e.g., lIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 927 (2d Cir. 1980).
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lying violation and substantial and knowing assistance by the defendant in
that underlying violation.98
The language of Section 10(b) is by far the broadest in scope of the
sections imposing civil liability. That a private right of action exists under
Rule lOb-5 is now without question.99 Not surprisingly, this is the section
under which most of the Supreme Court decisions arise and thus Section
lOb-5 has been the basis for the recent Supreme Court cases restricting
private suits.'0° Given this trend under Rule lOb-5, expansive cases involving
aiding and abetting liability are unlikely.' 0'
2. Knowledge
Once the plaintiff has established the underlying violation of the securities
laws, the second element necessary to establish liability for aiding and
abetting a securities violation is knowledge of the underlying securities
violation. 0 2 The plaintiff must prove two distinct knowledge requirements.
First, the defendant must have had some knowledge of the existence of the
action or inaction constituting the primary securities violation.03 Second, the
defendant must have had some knowledge that his assistance would further
that primary violation.' 4 These requirements should entail separate proof
but the courts often fail to distinguish between them.0 5 The second require-
ment is directly related to the substantial assistance element."
6
Courts have differed as to the threshold standard of knowledge of the
98. See supra text accompanying note 52; infra notes 102-20, 166-79 and accompanying
text.
99. Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Sante Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
100. See infra notes 181-88 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., State Teachers Retirement Board v. Fluor Corp., [1984 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 191,656 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 1984) (court refused to expand tippee
liability).
102. Harmsen v. Smith, 693 F.2d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822 (1983);
Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1039 (1978); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 94-97 (5th Cir. 1975).
103. Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 782 (8th Cir. 1981); UT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909
(1980); Ruder, supra note 5, at 630-38.
104. Herm v. Stafford, 663 F.2d 669, 684 (6th Cir. 1981); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304,
1316 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins.
Co., 417 F.2d 147, 154-55 (7th Cir. 1969); Timetrust, Inc. v. Sec, 142 F.2d 744 (9th Cir.
1944); Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Ruder, supra note 5, at 630-
38.
105. See, e.g., Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 163-64 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
960 (1974). Generally there are three ways to establish scienter: 1) direct evidence by written or
oral statements, 2) circumstantial evidence, and 3) evidence of reckless conduct. Note, The
Private Action Against a Securities Fraud Aider and Abettor: Silent and Inactive Conduct, 29
VAND. L. REV. 1233 (1976), citing Ruder, supra note 5, and A. BROMBERO, supra note 82, at
§ 8.4.
106. See infra text accompanying notes 166-79.
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primary violation.'0 7 At the very least, recklessness is required.'," Most courts,
however, require actual awareness of the underlying violation as opposed to
a reckless failure to discover the underlying violation.' °9 One of the most
often-quoted standards for knowledge of the underlying violation is stated
in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Coffey. 0 There the Sixth Circuit
stated that the knowledge requirement is satisfied if the defendant had a
"general awareness that his role is part of an overall activity that is
improper."" Because the courts often intertwine their discussion of the two
separate scienter requirements, it is difficult to determine the exact requisite
standard for proof of knowledge of the underlying violation." 2 The Fifth
Circuit has called this requirement the "crucial element" in ensuring that
aiders and abettors do not become insurers of other parties to a transaction
under a strict liability theory."'
In examining the knowledge requirement, courts look to the circumstan-
ces surrounding the transaction and the expectations of the parties involved." 4
For instance, if the transaction occurs in the ordinary course of business of
the alleged aider and abettor, more complicity is required to satisfy the
knowledge requirement. "' Perhaps the most important factor in this regard
is the presence of a fiduciary duty owed by the alleged aider and abettor to
the investor. ' 6 If such a relationship is present, a lower threshold standard
107. Id.
108. Harmsen v. Smith, 693 F.2d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822 (1983);
SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982); Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779 (8th
Cir. 1981); Edwards & Hanly v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478, 484 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38
(2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Tucker v. Janota, [1979 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,701, at 94,716 (N.D. II1. 1978). See Note, supra note 105, at 1261.
109. Harmsen v. Smith, 693 F.2d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822 (1983);
Edwards & Hanly v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478, 484 (2d Cir. 1979) (recklessness
is sufficient if the defendant breached a fiduciary duty), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980); Odette
v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); but see Stokes v. Lokken,
644 F.2d 779, 783 (8th Cir. 1981) (gross recklessness is necessary); Herm v. Stafford, 663 F.2d
669, 684 (6th Cir. 1981) (recklessness is sufficient).
110. 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974).
111. Id. at 1316. The Coffey court stated that the defendant must have actual knowledge
of and conscious intent to substantially assist the violation. Id.
112. Compare SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974) (standard is general awareness
that aider and abettor's role is part of overall improper activity), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908
(1975), with Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1973) (standard is knowledge of wrong's
existence), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 950 (1974). See Note, Aiding and Abetting Under Rule lOb-
5-A Stock Exchange May Be Liable for Aiding and Abetting a Securities Fraud Solely on the
Basis of its Failure to Act, 29 VAND. L. REv. 880 (1976) (comparison of approaches taken by
different circuits).
113. Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 96 (5th Cir. 1975) (citing Ruder, supra note
5, at 630-31).
114. See, e.g., Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 95 (5th Cir. 1975).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 95-96; Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, 681 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1982); Edwards &
Hanly v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478, 484-85 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
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of knowledge will suffice.117 Nevertheless, following Ernst & Ernst v. Hoch-
felder,"I at a minimum the courts will require recklessness." 9 Whether the
defendant merely should have been aware of the underlying securities viola-
tion is no longer an issue. Depending upon the circumstances surrounding
the transaction, the alleged aider and abettor must at least be reckless in
failing to discover the primary violation. In most cases, the defendant must
have a general awareness of his role in the improper activity.2
3. Knowing and Substantial Assistance
The basis of aiding and abetting liability is the requirement that the
defendant must have knowingly and substantially assisted the commission of
the primary violation.' 2 ' This element is the crux of the aiding and abetting
cause of action and the basis of the most discussion in the cases. The Second
Circuit stated in 11T v. Cornfeld:
[Miere bystanders, even if aware of the fraud, cannot be held liable
for inaction since they do not, in Judge Hand's words, associate
themselves with the venture or participate in it as something they
wish to bring about.'22
In Landy v. FDIC,123 the Third Circuit listed four factors in examining
substantial assistance: (1) the amount of assistance given by the defendant;
(2) his presence or absence at the time of the tort; (3) his relation to the
other person; and (4) his state of mind.' 24 The court also borrowed heavily
from Restatement of Torts, Section 436, which states:
444 U.S. 1045 (1980); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44-45 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Note, Liability for Aiding and Abetting Violations of Rule
lOb-5: The Recklessness Standard in Civil Damage Actions, 62 Tax. L. REv. 1087, 1109 (1984).
117. Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1975). See infra notes 155-64
and 166-79 and accompanying text.
118. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
119. See supra note 97 (discussing Hochfelder).
120. Id.; SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908
(1975).
121. Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 778-79 (1st Cir. 1983); Monsen v. Consol.
Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 800 (3d Cir. 1978); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84,
96-97 (5th Cir. 1975); Pettit v. American Stock Exchange, 217 F. Supp. 21, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
122. 619 F.2d 909, 927 (2d Cir. 1980). In 1IT v. Cornfeld, an accounting firm, an
underwriting firm and brokers were sued by the liquidators of an investment fund for allegedly
aiding and abetting various securities violations. The Second Circuit refused to accept the
plaintiffs' argument that the failure of the accounting firm to report various violations to the
proper authorities rendered the accounting firm liable for aiding and abetting a violation of the
securities laws.
123. 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
124. Id. at 163. In Landy, the plaintiffs, who were shareholders of a bank, alleged that
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If the encouragement or assistance is a substantial factor in causing
the resulting tort, the one giving it is himself a tortfeasor and is
responsible for the consequences of the other's acts.'25
a. Substantial Assistance
The substantial assistance element has two components: 1) the defend-
ant's substantial assistance toward the underlying violation by physical act
or omission; 26 and 2) knowledge that this assistance aids in the commission
of the underlying violation. 27 The assistance can either be some affirmative
act taken by the defendant or inaction when the defendant should have
acted. 12' The set of circumstances under which action or inaction is sufficient
to constitute substantial assistance is a question of fact determined on a case
by case basis.
i. Assistance by Affirmative Acts
The easiest cases for the courts to decide have been those in which the
alleged aider and abettor took some affirmative step to aid the primary
violator. Examples of acts which courts have determined are sufficient to
satisfy the substantial assistance test include verification by an accountant
of misleading financial statements in a prospectus, 29 encouragement by a
two brokers' purchases and sales of stock foreseeably permitted the bank's president to violate
Rule lOb-5 by independently siphoning the bank's funds. The bank was thereby forced into receiver-
ship. Applying the four factors, the court found that (1) the processing of the purchase and
sale orders constituted minor assistance; (2) the brokers were not present at the time of the presi-
dent's fraud; (3) the brokers were not involved in the purchase or sale of certain critical stock
and made no misrepresentations; and (4) the brokers did not possess the necessary state of mind.
125. RESTATEMENT (SEcom) oF ToRrs § 436 (1977). See supra note 42 and accompanying text
(text and discussion of § 876 of REsTATEmENT OF ToRts); Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co.,
394 F. Supp. 946, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F.
Supp. 673, 680 (N.D. Ind. 1966), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969); Ruder, supra note 5, at
620.
126. Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 778 (1st Cir. 1983); IIT v. Cornfeld, 619
F.2d 909, 925-28 (2d Cir. 1980); Edwards & Hanly v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602
F.2d 478, 483 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980).
127. IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 925-28 (2d Cir. 1980); Monsen v. Consol. Dressed
Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 800 (3d Cir. 1978); Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 552 F.2d 84,
96-97 (5th Cir. 1975). The dual nature of the substantial assistance element of aiding and
abetting liability originated in criminal law. See Ruder, supra note 5.
128. Compare Carroll v. First Nat'l Bank, 413 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1003 (1970), with Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir.
1969). In order to impose aiding and abetting liability, courts generally require the defendant
to have had more knowledge of his or her assistance in the violation of the securities laws
where the assistance arose from the defendant's failure to act than where the defendant's
assistance was active. See infra notes 167-79 and accompanying text.
129. SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982) (SEC proceeding). In Seaboard,
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bank of a company's issuance of unregistered subordinated debt accompanied
by the ability of the bank to terminate the issuance, a0 creation of a credit
bubble13' to conceal various speculative purchases in violation of Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act, 32 supplying false information to a securities firm
and falsifying the bank's records to conceal debt, 3  and loaning money to
investors to facilitate the sale of unregistered securities.3 4 The courts have
drawn a flexible line in determining whether a specific affirmative act is
sufficient to satisfy the substantial assistance requirement.'35 This is a factual
question that will be determined on the basis of all of the circumstances
surrounding the transaction or series of transactions in question. 36
ii. Assistance by Inaction
More troublesome to the courts are the cases in which the defendant is
alleged to have failed to act when he should have acted. '- Although the
courts vary considerably in their approaches to this area, several consistent
trends are present.
As a general rule, absent the presence of a special circumstance discussed
the court specifically noted that it was not deciding whether aiding and abetting liability exists
under the securities laws. Id.
130. Monsen v. Consol. Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1978). See infra text
accompanying notes 152-55 and 230-33.
131. A credit bubble can arise in a number of situations. In one case, Carroll v. First
National Bank, 413 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970), a bank made
large purchases of securities. Although the sellers of the securities required cash against delivery,
the bank allegedly delayed payment for as long as possible in the hope of a rising market.
132. Carroll v. First Nat'l Bank, 413 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003
(1970). See infra text accompanying notes 249-53.
133. Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See infra
text accompanying notes 209-13.
134. Tucker v. Janota, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. RaP. (CCH) 96,701 (N.D.
III. 1978). See infra text accompanying notes 155-56.
135. Compare Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978), with H. L. Federman & Co. v. Greenberg, 405 F. Supp. 1332
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). See also 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 82, at § 8.5 (substantial assistance may
include "repeating misrepresentations (or aiding in their preparation) .... by acting as conduits
to accumulate or distribute securities, ... executing transactions or investing proceeds, or
perhaps .. . financing transactions").
136. Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975). In Woodward, the Fifth
Circuit stated "Substantiality is a function of all of the circumstances." Id. at 97.
137. Some cases involving allegations of aiding and abetting through inaction arise through
the defendant's alleged failure to disclose some material point when he had a fiduciary duty to
do so. See, e.g., In re Flight Trans. Corp. Sec. Litig., [1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. RaP.
(CCH) 91,622 (D. Minn. July 5, 1984). Other cases of alleged aiding and abetting through
inaction result from the failure of the defendant to discover certain material matters. See, e.g.,
Edwards & Hanly v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980). Still other cases arise from the defendant's alleged failure to
report the violator to the authorities. See, e.g., Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co.,
417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969).
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below, no aiding and abetting liability exists for inaction alone. 3 " This is
true for at least three reasons. First, Restatements of Torts, Section 876, one
of the sources from which the aiding and abetting cause of action developed,
encompasses only the cause of physical harm and does not address economic
loss.3 9 At the time Section 876 was proposed, this section extended liability
to secondary defendants whose failure to act caused physical harm to
another. 140 Further extending liability to secondary defendants for economic
loss is a step the courts seem unwilling to take unless certain special
circumstances discussed below warrant such an extension.141
Second, the securities acts do not specifically address aiding and abetting
liability. Furthermore, the inclusion of the sections imposing liability on
controlling persons indicates a limitation of liability for secondary defend-
ants. 142 As discussed earlier, many of the sections on which the underlying
violations are based do not even specifically grant a private cause of action
and the courts have had to grant private rights of action judicially. 143 Further
imposing aiding and abetting liability on the basis of inaction alone expands
liability beyond what some courts view as the scope of the securities acts.44
Third, courts have declined to impose aiding and abetting liability under
the securities law for failure to act because the alleged conduct is the subject
of other federal or state laws that preempt liability under the securities laws.
As the Fifth Circuit stated in Woodwai.- v. Metro Bank:
The court must ask whether the conduct in the case before it was
the type of behavior meant to be forbidden by the securities acts,
remembering that business transactions are not all reducible to a
purchase or sale of a security. Many areas of business activity are
governed by state laws, such as the Uniform Commercial Code, or
other federal laws, such as the Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601
et seq. (1970), and the antitrust laws. Some transactions, it is only
logical to assume, should be left to the operation of these other
138. IT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 925-26 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Wessel v. Buhler, 437
F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971); Ruder, supra note 5. See infra text accompanying notes 148-65
(discussing circumstances in which courts impose liability for aiding and abetting where
defendant has failed to act). Some courts allow aiding and abetting actions based solely on
inaction if the silence or inaction was consciously intended to aid the underlying violation. IT
v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975); Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971).
139. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 876 (1977). See supra note 42 (text of Section 876);
supra note 125 (cases citing Section 876).
140. See RESTATEMNT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 876 (1977) (illustrating effect of Section 876).
141. See infra text accompanying notes 148-66 (discussion of special circumstances in which
courts impose aiding and abetting liability for inaction).
142. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
144. IT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980); Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279 (9th
Cir. 1971).
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laws, for Rule lOb-5 was not designed to be the ethical Ten Com-
mandments for all securities transactions. 45
Although the Supreme Court has held that remedies under different provi-
sions of the Securities Act are cumulative,146 courts have preferred to require
actions under other federal or state laws when the acts in question clearly
fall within the prohibitions of one of those acts and only questionably fall
within the prohibitions of the securities acts.1
4 7
As an exception to the general rule, several sets of special circumstances
exist under which the courts will impose liability in failure to act cases. These
include profit to the alleged aider and abettor by his failure to act, 48 the
ability of the alleged aider and abettor to discover material inside informa-
tion,149 the relationship of the defendant to the other parties,"' and the
presence of a fiduciary duty by the alleged aider and abettor to another
party in the transaction.'
Two cases exemplify the application of the special circumstances excep-
tion. In Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., Inc.,5 2 the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant bank aided and abetted a corporation's issuance
of its unregistered promissory notes pursuant to an optional employee payroll
deduction plan. In loaning money to the corporation, the bank required that
the promissory notes be subordinated to the bank's loans, which the corpo-
ration agreed to do. The employees did not know of the subordination nor
of the violation of the securities acts by the corporation's failure to register
the payroll deduction plan. Although the bank should have known of the plan's
illegality, the bank encouraged the corporation to continue the note program.
In imposing aiding and abetting liability against the bank, the court of
appeals gave considerable weight to the bank's improved position through
the continuation of the note program.' Although this case involved a
combination of the secondary defendant's affirmative act (the bank's en-
couragement to continue the note program) with the primary violators' failure
145. 522 F.2d 84, 90-91 (5th Cir. 1975) (footnote omitted).
146. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
147. See, e.g., Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1974).
148. See Monsen v. Consol. Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1978); Gould v.
American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 780 (3d Cir. 1976); infra text accompanying notes
152-55 and 230-33 (discussing Monsen).
149. See Tucker v. Janota, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REp. (CCH) 96,701, at
97,716 (N.D. IH. 1978); infra text accompanying notes 155-56.
150. See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47-48 (2d Cir.) (suit
against registered representative for allegedly aiding and abetting investment advisor's viola-
tions), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); see also infra text accompanying notes 157-65.
151. See Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 95-96 (5th Cir. 1975); Brennan v.
Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969); In re Flight Transp. Corp. Sec.
Litig., 11984 Transfer Binder] FaD. Sac. L. RP. (CCH) 91,622 (D. Minn. July 5, 1984).
152. 575 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1978).
153. Id. at 802.
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to act (the company's failure to disclose to the employees the subordinated
status of the debt), the plaintiffs' loss was primarily due to the company's
failure to disclose. In imposing liability, the court acknowledged that the bank
had no duty of disclosure to the employees and stressed that, while the bank
had the authority to require the corporation to discontinue the program, the
bank instead encouraged the continuation of the program to its own profit.'1
4
In Tucker v. Janota,'"1 the district court examined aiding and abetting
liability in the context of a defendant's failure to discover material inside
information. In Tucker, certain banks had a standing arrangement with an
investment firm pursuant to which the investment firm referred potential
investors to one of the banks for loans. The proceeds of these loans were
used to make various investments in tax shelters and limited partnerships.
The investment firm was not qualified to design the shelters and the securities
were not properly registered. The investors lost their money and turned to
one of the banks for recovery. The court held the bank liable on an aiding
and abetting theory. The court first determined that the bank owed no duty
of inquiry regarding the securities to the investors but found, however, that
the bank consciously and substantially assisted the fraudulent scheme.5 6 In
imposing liability on the bank, the court coupled the affirmative act of the
defendant in loaning money to the investors with the bank's failure to
determine that the securities were not registered and that the investment firm
was not qualified to design the tax shelters. It is important to note in this
respect that the plaintiffs lost money as a result of the bank's failure to
discover and disclose the problems surrounding the investment firm and not
as a result of the bank's loans. The court properly should have treated the
events as a case of the bank's failure to act.
The bulk of the special exception inaction cases, however, arise in the
situation where the alleged aider and abettor owes a fiduciary duty to the
investor.' -7 In these cases, the courts generally allow an aiding and abetting
cause of action based on inaction alone.' One example of this situation is
Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance Company.' 9 In Brennan, a
154. Id. at 803, n.17-18.
155. [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,701 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 1978).
156. !d. at 94,716. In Tucker, in order to hold the defendant liable for inaction, the court
required the plaintiff to prove the defendant's conscious intent to aid and abet the securities
violation. See infra text accompanying notes 167-79.
157. See Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975); Brennan v.
Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969); In re Flight Transp. Corp. Sec.
Litig., [1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,622 (D. Minn. 1984); Rosen v.
Dick, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,786 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The
Supreme Court has defined duty as "aris[ing] from the relationship between the parties ...
and not merely from one's ability to acquire information because of his position in the market."
Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 185 (1980).
158. The courts generally require conscious intent in these circumstances. See infra notes
167-79 and accompanying text.
159. 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969).
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corporation whose securities were being traded through a particular broker-
dealer advised persons complaining of certain of the broker-dealer's actions
to try to resolve the problems directly with the broker-dealer and, if still
unsatisfied, to report him to the Indiana Securities Commission or the SEC.
The broker-dealer's manipulative actions in selling short and maintaining a
market in these securities increased their value. The district court held that the
corporation aided and abetted the broker-dealer's violations of Rule lOb-5
by advising complainants to deal directly with the broker-dealer and by
failing to report him to the Indiana Securities Commission or the SEC after
threatening to do so. 60 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision.' 6' By advising persons to contact the broker-dealer directly, the
corporation alerted the broker-dealer to potential problems that could be
rectified without interference from the regulators. The court found that this
behavior violated the corporation's fiduciary duty to its shareholders. The
court did not state whether the failure to disclose the matter to the authorities
absent the statements to the complainants was sufficient to establish liability."
6
2
This case has been cited to support the argument that silence and inaction alone
is a basis for aiding and abetting liability."13 Brennan also has been cited to sup-
port the argument that silence and inaction must be combined with some affirm-
ative act before the substantial assistance criterion is met. '64 The court stressed
in Brennan, however, that the combination of the silent acquiescence and
the affirmative referrals to the broker-dealer was the basis for imposition of
liability. ,65
b. Knowledge of Assistance
As discussed earlier, the defendant must know that his actions will
substantially assist the underlying violation. In cases where the defendant
rendered assistance by affirmative act, knowledge is proven through the
presumption that one is aware of the natural and logical consequences of his
acts. 66 In cases where the defendant rendered assistance by silence or-
inaction, however, proof of knowing assistance is more difficult.
What proof of knowledge is necessary in inaction cases often revolves
around the presence or absence of a fiduciary duty, particularly a duty of
disclosure."67 As the Fifth Circuit stated in Woodward v. Metro Bank:
160. 286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
161. 417 F.2d at 155.
162. Id. at 154.
163. Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 96 (5th Cir. 1975).
164. Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 161 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 950 (1974).
165. 417 F.2d at 154.
166. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 41 (5th ed. 1984).
167. See, e.g., IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980); Brennan v. Midwestern United
Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969).
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When it is impossible to find any duty of disclosure, an alleged
aider-abettor should be found liable only if scienter of the higher
"conscious intent" variety can be proved. Where some special duty
of disclosure exists, then liability should be possible with a lesser
degree of scienter .... In a case combining silence/inaction with
affirmative assistance, the degree of knowledge required should
depend on how ordinary the assisting activity is in the business
involved. 61
In a situation involving inaction where the alleged aider and abettor owes a
fiduciary duty to the injured party, less scienter need be shown. 69 In contrast,
if the alleged aider and abettor owes no duty in the transaction, "conscious
intent" is necessary. 70 Furthermore, in such cases courts generally require
proof of the requisite intent by direct evidence rather than by inference.'
7'
When the aider and abettor owes no fiduciary duty, courts view the defendant
as more remote and state that the requisite degree of scienter scales upward
as the parties become more remote. 72 "Remoteness" tends to turn on the
presence or absence of a special duty173 although some courts view remoteness
as a function of causation. 74
A higher degree of scienter is required where the assisting activity is a
routine part of business. 7 If the assisting activity is outside of normal
business practices or lacks business justification, the courts require a lesser
showing of scienter. 7 6 In practice, however, scienter is inferred by circum-
168. 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1975) (footnotes omitted).
169. The courts impose a recklessness standard when the alleged aider and abettor owed a
fiduciary duty to the plaintiff. Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774 (1st Cir. 1983); Decker
v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d Ill (2d Cir. 1982); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co.,
570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522
F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1974); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
170. IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 925 (2d Cir. 1980); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522
F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1034 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 908 (1975); Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971); Rosen v. Dick, [1974-1975
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,786 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
171. See note, supra note 105.
172. Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1974).
173. See, e.g., id. at 97.
174. See, e.g., Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960
(1974). The argument is that if the defendant's actions are considered too "remote," the actions
did not "cause" the plaintiff's loss.
175. Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F;2d 84 (5th Cir. 1974); Ruder, supra note
5, at 633. See Note, supra note 105.
176. Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1974); Brennen v. Midwestern United
Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); Ruder, supra note 5;
Note, supra note 105.
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stantial evidence when the abetting activity is not a routine part of business.
Thus, courts only require less proof by direct evidence. 77 For example, in
Long v. McAlpin, 78 a bank acted as a depository for cash received by an
investment fund. The bank waived its normal handling fee and had no power
to pass on the merit or frequency of investments. The court of appeals imposed
no liability for aiding and abetting the investment manager's churning of ac-
counts. The waiver of the usual handling fee by the depository negated any
inference of assistance for pecuniary gain. In the same case, two other banks
served as custodians. One bank acted solely at the direction of the trustee
and no proof was offered against the other bank for alleged transfers of funds
to inappropriate parties. Again, the Second Circuit refused to impose liability. 79
First, the banks' actions were not the cause of the plaintiffs' losses and second,
the banks acted in the normal course of business and lacked scienter.
By establishing a sliding scale for determining the presence of scienter,
the courts can be flexible in imposing aiding and abetting liability. The
sliding scale does not provide much guidance, however, to parties trying to
determine in advance the permissible parameters of behavior in specific
transactions. The courts must be consistent in their approaches to aiding and
abetting cases to achieve in the marketplace a more efficient use of resources,
knowledge of permissible behavioral parameters and the allocation of poten-
tial risks among the parties involved.
C. Recent Supreme Court Decisions
In a trend affecting not only aiding and abetting liability but also primary
liability and secondary liability, the Supreme Court has restricted the scope
of the coverage of the securities acts through a series of fairly recent decisions.
Most notably, the Court begins with the language of the specific statute.'s8
The Court has rejected the imposition of liability based solely on the broad
policies behind the securities acts.' 8' For example, the Court upheld the so-
called Birnbaum rule in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores 8" which
requires that a plaintiff in a Section 10(b) case be a purchaser or seller of a
security to satisfy the "in connection with" requirement of Section 10(b).18 3
177. See Long v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1983). See generally Ruder, supra note 3;
Note, supra note 105.
178. 699 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1983).
179. Id. The court dismissed because of the plaintiff's failure to plead the defendant's
alleged fraud with particularity. The defendant's actions were within standard business practices.
180. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Sante Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
181. See supra note 180.
182. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
183. Id. at 754-55. In Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), the
court held that because the language of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5 proscribed
only fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, only actual purchasers and
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In Sante Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,'8 4 the Court refused to find that a
breach of fiduciary duty involving oppressive conduct actionable under state
corporate law amounted to a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
under Rule lOb-5.' 85 In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,8 6 the Court examined
the language and legislative history of Section 10(b) and concluded that
negligence alone is insufficient to impose liability, and that scienter is necessary.
In addition, the Court recently clarified and restricted tippee liability in
Chiarella v. United States'87 and Dirks v. SEC.'88
The Ninth Circuit questioned the availability of an aiding and abetting
cause of action under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act in light of these
cases, in a footnote in SEC v. Seaboard Corp.8 The parties assumed
potential aiding and abetting liability; therefore, the Ninth Circuit considered
the case on that basis, and expressly declined to confront the underlying
issue. The Ninth Circuit cited the Supreme Court's prescription for a strict
construction of the securities laws rather than a mere reliance on the broad
policy objectives of the securities acts. The Seaboard court also restated
Professor Fischel's arguments that Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder implicitly
held that aiding and abetting liability does not exist as a separate offense
and that the Supreme Court, if confronted with the question, probably would
not recognize secondary liability theories. 90
The same circuit, however, reversed its position in Harmsen v. Smith.' 9'
The court of appeals stated that the Supreme Court had not yet followed
the suggestion made in the footnote in Seaboard and that other circuits still
impose liability for aiding and abetting a securities law violation. 92 Given
sellers can maintain Rule lob-5 actions. 193 F.2d at 463-64. In Blue Chip Stamps, the Court
adopted both the reasoning and the conclusion of Birnbaum.
184. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
185. Id. The Court ruled that Rule lOb-5 and Section 10b of the Exchange Act specifically
addressed manipulative and deceptive practices, and that these provisions did not extend to a
breach of fiduciary duty that did not involve deception or manipulation. Id. at 492-96.
186. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
187. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). In Chiarella, a printing company employee obtained material
nonpublic information regarding companies that were about to merge or be taken over,
purchased stock in those companies before the takeovers were public information and then sold
the stock at a profit. The Court held that he could not be convicted of fraud under Section
10(b) because he had no duty to disclose that information to the sellers absent some relationship
with the sellers that would give rise to a duty to disclose.
188. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). In Dirks, the Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals
in upholding an SEC censure of a securities analyst. The analyst had discovered fraud in a
corporation he analyzed and had passed that information to clients, who immediately sold the
corporation's stock. The Court held that the analyst should not be censured merely because his
position in the market as a securities analyst gave him access through legitimate means to
certain nonpublic inside information. The Court reaffirmed its holding in Chiarella that the
analyst had no duty to disclose where he was not an agent or fiduciary of the corporation, nor
a person in whom the sellers of the securities had placed their trust and confidence. Id. at 922.
189. 677 F.2d 1301, 1311 n.12 (9th Cir. 1982).
190. Id. (citing Fischel, supra note 17).
191. 693 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1982).
192. Id. at 944.
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this retreat by the only court to reexamine the issue following the recent
restrictive decisions by the Supreme Court, lower courts are unlikely to
follow Seaboard's suggestion unless the Supreme Court gives some new
reason to do so.
III. POTENTIAL LIABILITY OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
A. Transactions which Foster Potential Aiding
and Abetting Liability
Financial institutions enter into myriad transactions that present poten-
tial liability for aiding and abetting a securities violation. Given the recent
proliferation of banking services, this potential liability becomes even more
apparent. 93 Five specific types of transactions which foster aiding and abetting
liability will be discussed: 1) loans; 94 2) credit enhancement;"9 3) dis-
semination of information; 96 4) actions taken by banks acting in a fiduciary
relationship; 197 and 5) direct aid of a conscious scheme to defraud. 9
1. Loans
The standard loan transaction is the most common transaction that may
give rise to aiding and abetting liability. Obviously a loan may be structured
in a variety of ways. Although each may present its own problems, the
general problems created by the various structures are very similar.' 99 Direct
loans, letters of credit and construction loans constitute only a few of the
various possible loan structures."' Each case discussed below in which liability
was imposed involved a separate security sufficient to satisfy the underlying
securities violation requirement.
193. The Glass-Steagall Act, Ch. 89, 48. Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.), prohibits banks from engaging is most investment banking and securities activities.
As summarized in Comment, Regulation of Bank Securities Activities, 41 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1187 (1984), and Note, National Banks and the Brokerage Business: The Comptroller's
New Reading of the Glass-Steagall Act, 69 VA. L. REv. 1303 (1983), the distinction between
commercial and investment banking is blurring. As banks become increasingly involved in
investment banking activities, they must also remain aware of the securities laws ramifications.
194. See infra notes 199-218 and accompanying text.
195. See infra notes 219-37 and accompanying text. Techniques of credit enhancement
are similar to standard loan transactions except that considerations also arise regarding the
underlying security which is the recipient of the credit enhancement.
196. See infra text accompanying notes 238-43.
197. See infra notes 244-48 and accompanying text.
198. See infra text accompanying notes 249-53.
199. Banks generate income through the making of loans and the collection of fees from
services rendered. Many of the different transactions banks enter entail some form of the
standard loan, whether it is a residential mortgage loan, revolving term loan, letter of credit
issuance or an agreement to purchase securities in the future.
200. See Annot., 39 A.L.R. FED. 357 (1978) (discussion of whether promissory note
constitutes a security); see also Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974); Comment,
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In each loan transaction, the financial institution should be aware of
both the intended use and the actual use of the proceeds of the loan. In
addition to the bank's concern as to the ability of the debtor to repay the
loan, the bank should be aware of the use of the proceeds for federal
securities purposes. 20 If the proceeds of the loan are used to commit, or are
the product of, a securities law violation, the bank faces a potential lawsuit
for aiding and abetting that violation.
20 2
For example, in Edwards & Hanly v. Wells Fargo Securities Clearance
Corp.,2 -  a bank loaned money to a broker ostensibly trading securities on
matched sales. The broker, however, began selling the securities short for
his own account in violation of Regulation T204 and lost money in a rising
market. The bank only later became aware of the fact that the sales were
short. The plaintiff, a securities firm, then turned to the bank for recovery
on an aiding and abetting theory. The federal district court held for the




The Second Circuit rejected the plaintiff's argument that "but for"
causation is sufficient to establish the requisite knowing and substantial
assistance element. 20 7 The plaintiff lost money not because of the bank's loan
to the broker but because the broker did not inform the plaintiff that the
sales were not matched sales. Only if the bank's employee had a duty to
disclose his knowledge of the short sales would the court impose liability.
The plaintiff, however, failed to use due diligence to discover that the
broker's sales were short. Consistent late deliveries of the stock should have
put the plaintiff on notice that the sales were short, the plaintiff should have
inquired whether the sales were short, and if so, the plaintiff should have
"bought in" within a reasonable time.20 s Therefore the Second Circuit
deemed recovery against the bank inappropriate.
Notes as Securities under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
36 MD. L. REV. 233 (1976). Because aiding and abetting liability requires an underlying securities
violation, whether a standard promissory note constitutes a "security" triggering the jurisdiction
of the federal securities laws is a question of direct liability which is not within the scope of
this article.
201. Through most banks' loan application and approval processes, the bank will be aware
of the intended use of loan proceeds. Unless the bank institutes some control over the actual
use of the proceeds in the loan documents, however, the bank will have no assurance that the
proceeds will be spent in accordance with the bank's expectations.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 102-20 and 166-79 (before bank will be held liable,
bank must have some actual or imputed knowledge of the securities laws violations).
203. 602 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980).
204. Regulation T, promulgated under the Exchange Act by the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, relates to the method by which purchases or sales of securities by
broker firms may be made. 12 C.F.R. § 220.4 (1985).
205. 458 F. Supp. 1110 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
206. 602 F.2d at 489.
207. Id. at 484-89.
208. "Buying in" refers to the purchase of stock for the purpose of returning stock
previously borrowed to make delivery on a short sale.
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Edwards & Hanly must be read cautiously. Although the bank was not
held liable in this case, the case is an example of a bank's failure to discover
its customer's actual use of loan proceeds. The bank originally believed that
it was only loaning funds to the broker for use while the purchaser's funds
cleared but this was not true. Had the bank been more involved in the
broker's activities and thus either known, or had reason to know, of the
broker's violations, the result might have been different. Edwards & Hanly
turned on a factual question of causation and did not hold that a plaintiff
cannot prevail on a theory of aiding and abetting against a bank that knows
or should know of the principal defendant's violation of securities laws.
In Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co.,2°9 the federal district court denied
a motion by the third-party defendant to dismiss for failure to state a cause
of action where the plaintiff had alleged a sale of a corporation's securities
by the defendant while the defendant possessed materially adverse inside
information about the corporation. The principal defendants sought indem-
nification and contribution against a bank for aiding and abetting, and
conspiring with, the corporation's officers who gave false information to the
principal defendant. The bank allegedly made long-term loans to the cor-
poration in excess of the bank's legal lending limit and in exchange for
bribes. The bank also allegedly falsified its books to make the loans appear
as if made to a third party to conceal the violation of the lending limit and
to assist the corporation in concealing some of its debt. 210 The corporation
also allegedly falsified its own books to further conceal the debt.
The Odette court refused to allow the indemnification action."', The
court, however, permitted the principal defendant to proceed with the
contribution action for aiding and abetting. The principal defendant's ability
to recover turned on the bank's substantial assistance.21 2 The court found
substantial assistance even though the bank made no direct misrepresentations
to those who were ultimately deceived. The bank's cooperation in the
falsification of the corporation's books was necessary for the overall scheme
to succeed and constituted sufficient substantial assistance for the imposition
of liability.
2 3
In Tucker v. Janota24 discussed above, two banks allegedly made loans
to customers of an investment firm to provide the customers with sufficient
funds to invest in certain tax shelters. The banks were aware that the
209. 394 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), on remand from 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974).
210. Id. at 953.
211. Id. at 954-55. The plaintiff would have to prove the principal defendant's knowledge
or recklessness in committing the violations. The principal defendant's scienter precludes an ac-
tion against a third-party defendant for indemnification. See Fischer, Contribution in 10b-5 Actions,
33 Bus. LAW. 1821 (1978).
212. 394 F. Supp. at 963.
213. Id. at 961.
214. [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,701 (N.D. Ill. 1978); supra
text accompanying notes 155-56.
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availability of their loans was a definite selling point for the investment firm.
There was no evidence that the banks made efforts to determine if the
investment firm was qualified to design a tax shelter or to counsel investors
as to the necessity of registration. The court found irrelevant the fact that
the banks undertook their own credit checks of customers and turned down
some of them. 215 The threshold issue was the banks' failure to determine the
qualifications of the firm to design the tax shelters and to register them.
21 6
Some transactions are not structured as loans but nonetheless result in
the flow of funds from a bank to its customer. For example, in H.L.
Federman & Co. v. Greenberg,217 a Japanese bank allegedly provided a flow
of money not through a direct loan but through the purchase of options to
purchase the corporation's stock. The court refused to grant a motion by
the defendant bank to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. The
option purchases were part of an illegal scheme to funnel the corporation's
funds to the corporation's insiders. Although this case did not involve a
direct loan, the effect of the option purchases, providing funds for an illegal
scheme, was the same.
21 8
2. Credit Enhancement
The various techniques of credit enhancement also present potential
liability for aiding and abetting violations. 2 9 In connection with a loan, a
bank may require, for example, an accommodation party,220 the subordina-
tion of certain debt, 22 1 or a security interest in or lien on financed or other
property. Courts have considered whether a bank's transactions with accom-
modation parties or debt subordination may subject the bank to aiding and
abetting liability. 222 Absent special circumstances, the creation of a security
interest or lien on property does not produce securities law problems. M
215. Tucker v. Janota, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,701 (N.D.
Ill. 1978).
216. Id. Neither the underlying credit nor the sophistication of the borrowers was at issue
in Tucker. See id.
217. 405 F. Supp. 1332 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
218. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text. No securities laws violations were
claimed regarding the option purchases. Plaintiffs based their claim against the Japanese bank
on its assistance in securities violations in connection with the plaintiffs' stock purchases.
219. Credit enhancement refers to the various ways in which a bank, either for itself or
another, minimizes either the risks of default or the lack of meaningful remedies if a default
occurs.
220. See, e.g., Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975); see also infra text
accompanying notes 224-29 (discussion of Woodward). An accommodation party is also referred
to as a cosignor.
221. See, e.g., Monsen v. Consol. Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 930 (1978); see also infra text accompanying notes 230-33 and 249-52 (discussion of
Monsen). When a bank seeks debt subordination, consent of the existing creditor is necessary
before subordination may occur.
222. See infra text accompanying notes 224-37.
223. The creation of a lien on real property or a security interest in personal property is
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An example of a case involving an accommodation party is Woodward
v. Metro Bank.2 4 In Woodward, a housewife cosigned a corporation's ninety-
day note to a bank and pledged certain of her stock as security for the loan.
The loan actually was made to the corporation's officer rather than to the
corporation itself, and the officer deposited the money into the corporation's
account. The pledge agreement, however, provided that the pledge was
"against all indebtedness now owing or which may hereafter become owing"
to the bank by the officer as the obligor on the note. 25 The corporation's
officer defaulted on subsequent indebtedness and the bank instituted suit
against the cosignor. After a full trial on the merits, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the dismissal by the district court of the suit against the bank. The
Fifth Circuit did not, however, affirm the district court's rationale. 226 The
relevant state law did not impose on the bank a duty of disclosure to the
accommodation party, and the court of appeals would not impose such a
duty under the guise of federal securities laws. 22 7 The court stated that not
all business transactions "are reducible to a purchase or sale of a security
' 22
1
and that many areas are better left to state laws or other federal laws such
as, in this case, the Truth-in-Lending Act.22 9
An example of potential aiding and abetting liability in the context of
debt subordination is Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co." In Mon-
sen, a bank encouraged the continuation of a corporation's voluntary payroll
deduction plan pursuant to which the employees held unregistered notes of
the corporation. The employees were unaware that the payroll deduction
plan was subordinated to the debt owed to the bank. The Third Circuit
overturned the district court's decision. The district court had granted
judgment for the bank notwithstanding the jury's verdict against the bank.
232
The plaintiff had presented evidence at trial that the bank knew of the
payroll deduction plan, should have known of the plan's illegality and had
the authority to require the corporation to discontinue the plan, but instead
the bank improved its secured position by encouraging continuation of the
generally a two-party transaction between the debtor and creditor. Indeed, Section 3(a)(5) of
the Exchange Act exempts certain mortgages from registration requirements. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5)
(1982). If the property pledged as collateral includes securities, however, the securities laws
clearly are applicable.
224. 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975).
225. Id. at 88.
226. Id. In Woodward, the district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction because
Section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act exempted the promissory note from registration. See 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982); supra note 200 and accompanying text.
227. See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. 342-705 (1973). Id. at 99. The approach of the Fifth
Circuit in Woodward is consistent with the Supreme Court's later admonition in Sante Fe
Industries, Inc. v. Green against the development of a body of federal corporate law. See 430
U.S. 462 (1977).
228. 522 F.2d at 91.
229. Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1976) (Truth-in-Lending Act).
230. 579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978).
232. Id. at 804. The district court's opinion is unpublished.
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plan. The Third Circuit found this evidence sufficient to support the jury's
verdict. The court of appeals acknowledged that the bank had no duty of
disclosure to the employee noteholders. The Third Circuit stressed, however,
that the bank required the continuation and subordination of the plan
knowing that the corporation would not disclose to the noteholders its
deteriorated financial condition and the subordination of the note program. 233
In a footnote, the Third Circuit distinguished the Monsen facts from the
facts in Woodward.21 The plaintiff in Woodward failed to establish the
bank's knowledge of its borrower's fraud whereas the plaintiff in Monsen
established the bank's close supervision of the unregistered note program.
This distinction, however, will not allow a bank to close its eyes to securities
laws violations by its borrowers. Once a bank has notice, whether constructive
or actual, that a violation may have occurred or is about to occur, the bank
should make further inquiry. 235 If the inquiry proves unsatisfactory, the bank
should take whatever steps are necessary to cure the violation. 236 Although a
defendant should not be liable for aiding and abetting a securities violation
solely on the basis of negligent inaction, 237 the cases are inconsistent at best.
In addition, a court's determination of where the fine line between negligent
and reckless inaction falls is impossible to predict.
3. Dissemination of Information
A bank's provision of, or failure to provide, information to others about
the bank's customers can also render the bank susceptible to liability for
aiding and abetting a violation of the securities laws. 23 In Pettit v. American
Stock Exchange,23 9 the plaintiff alleged that certain Swiss banks aided and
abetted the fraudulent sale of securities by allowing the principals to open
and maintain dummy accounts, by assisting in concealing the identity of
traders in the securities and by aiding in the sale of unregistered securities.
233. Id. The Third Circuit in Monsen looked to the bank's improved position and the
noteholders' detriment as well as the bank's ability to control the corporation's continuation or
discontinuation of the note program. Even though the bank owed no fiduciary duty to the
noteholders, the court did not allow the bank to profit when the bank knew of the securities
violation and made no attempt to correct it.
234. Id. at 803 n.18.
235. In the situation presented in Monsen, the bank does not stand in a fiduciary
relationship with the subordinated creditor. See id. Because the standard for aiding and abetting
liability is whether the bank knowingly and substantially assisted a primary securities violation,
inquiry is the first step. If the inquiry results in a reasonable conclusion that no violation
occurred or is occurring, the bank should not be held liable for aiding and abetting.
236. In curing the violation of the securities laws that a bank's customer has committed,
the bank must be careful not to commit other violations. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646
(1983). If the bank is unable to cure the violation, the bank must somehow ensure that its
actions do not substantially assist the underlying violation.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 137-79.
238. The bank must also be concerned with its duty of confidentiality. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 3403 (1978).
239. 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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The federal district court held that these allegations were sufficient to permit
denial of the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of
action. Although this case involved more than concealing certain information,
the concealment was considered a crucial element of the case.
240
In Grimes, Hooper & Messer, Inc. v. Pierce,24' the Ninth Circuit in a
one-page opinion affirmed the district court's dismissal of suit under Rule
lOb-5 against a bank for aiding and abetting a swindle by a short-seller. The
bank allegedly permitted certain brokers to believe that their mutual customer
was "a man of means and probity.''242 The plaintiffs claimed that the
deception was undertaken for the purpose of creating a false aura of financial
and moral responsibility. The court did not detail its reasons for its summary
dismissal. From Pettit and Grimes one can glean that the alleged aider and
abettor must have some reasonably direct relationship with the underlying
violation. Providing, or failing to provide, certain necessary information
must constitute assistance that is substantial before liability can be invoked.
243
4. Fiduciary Dealing
Another avenue for recovery against a bank is the bank's misfeasance
or inaction when acting in a trust capacity. In Armstrong v. McAlpin, 244 the
plaintiff alleged churning by an investment manager and aiding and abetting
of that violation by the depository trustee of the affected fund and two
custodian banks. The trustee's role was limited by the trust deed to serving
as the depository for cash received by, and for investments made on behalf
of, the funds. The trustee possessed no power to pass on the merit or
frequency of investments and also waived its normal handling fee. The Second
Circuit held that no aiding and abetting liability existed. The trustee's lack
of power over the investments, coupled with its absence of incentive to churn
the account, was determinative.24 1 In addtion, the plaintiff did not establish
the liability of the two custodian banks. 246 One bank acted solely at the direc-
tion of the trustee and the other bank never transferred funds to any inap-
propriate party.
The importance of this case should not be understated. The court
implicitly recognized that not all of the parties involved in a particular
transaction or series of transactions are sufficiently related to the underlying
violation to justify the imposition of liability. The Second Circuit examined
whether the underlying violation was a cause of the plaintiff's loss and, if
240. Id. at 30-31.
241. 519 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1975).
242. Id.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 121-65.
244. 699 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1983).
245. Id. at 92.
246. Id. at 92-93. The court dismissed the actions against the banks for the plaintiff's lack




so, whether the secondary defendant's knowledge of the underlying violation
and knowing and substantial assistance were sufficient to justify the impo-
sition of liability."" As one court stated, "substantiality is a function of all
the circumstances." '48 Other slightly varied factual situations, however, may
not produce the same result.
5. Direct Aid
Direct aid by affirmative action of a conscious scheme to defraud
presents a fifth scenario which may lead to aiding and abetting liability.
Courts have not had difficulty in deciding such cases. Perhaps the best
example of this type of case is Carroll v. First National Bank.24 9 Carroll
involved a fraud in which the defendants caused the plaintiffs to finance a
credit bubble in connection with purchases by the principal defendants from
plaintiffs of large amounts of securities for speculative purposes. 2 0 The
defendant bank did not purchase securities for its own account but was in a
unique position to obtain a delay of time between the purchase date and
actual payment. During the delay, the principal defendants expected the
value of the securities to rise. 25 Payments were to be made by the bank
against delivery of the securities but the bank delayed payment by giving
assurances that arrangements for payment were either unavoidably delayed
or in progress. The bank also arranged for undisclosed or fictitious persons
to bail out certain overdue transactions. The scheme failed in a falling market
and the lawsuit ensued.
252
Carroll exemplifies the classic aiding and abetting case. The underlying
violations were clear. The bank obviously knew of the underlying violations
and its positive assistance was both substantial and knowing. The bank had
no reasonable commercial rationale for its actions, indicating the bank's
knowing complicity in the fraudulent scheme. 2 3 This is the type of behavior
that Congress and the courts clearly want to prohibit.
Rosen v. Dick 25 4 is another example of aiding and abetting liability in a
transaction lacking commercial reasonableness. In Rosen, the defendant bank
was aware of embezzlement by the president of a target corporation in a
takeover attempt. The bank allegedly aided in the embezzlement by not
reporting it to the acquiring corporation. In imposing liability on the bank,
the district court stated that the law did not require the plaintiff to prove
any affirmative duty to the bank to disclose the embezzlement to establish
causation. The Rosen court stated, "Secondary liability under the federal
247. Id. at 91-92.
248. Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1975).
249. 413 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970).
250. See supra note 131 (explanation of a credit bubble).
251. 413 F.2d at 355-56.
252. Id. at 356.
253. Id.
254. [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RE'. (CCH) 94,786 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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securities laws may be imposed if a person has actual knowledge of another's
improper scheme plus an intent to further that scheme (i.e., scienter), and
he has given substantial assistance to the primary wrongdoer." 2"1 The bank
had no apparent commercially reasonable rationale for its conduct.
The extension of liability to transactions that are commercially reason-
able, however, is more tenuous. Commercial reasonableness is relevant to
the defendant's knowledge of the underlying violation. In transactions that
are commercially reasonable, courts should require plaintiffs to meet the
higher standard of conscious intent.
B. Extension of Doctrine to Other Banking Practices
The principles of the cases may be extended fairly easily to other current
banking practices. One of the foremost areas in which this extension is likely
to occur is in the area of loans to corporate raiders in attempted acquisitions
or to target companies in defending against takeovers. Another area giving
rise to potential aiding and abetting liability is the increased underwriting
activity by banks either pursuant to, or notwithstanding, the Glass-Steagall
Act.
2 5 6
Rosen laid the foundation for the imposition of liability in the takeover
context.?" The law in this area is developing daily as the present Unocal ligita-
tion suggests. 2 8 As banks increasingly become defendants in the litigious battles
fought for corporate control, each bank should be aware of the potential causes
of action involved in each takeover to which the bank is a direct or even remote
party. If the takeover appears to contain the potential for rendering the bank
liable for aiding and abetting a securities law violation, the banks may want
to negotiate for certain advance protections from liability from other parties
to the extent the law and the circumstances of the transaction permit. 2 9
The expansion of underwriting practices by financial institutions also
further exposes such institutions to securities law liability. 268 As banks seek
255. Id. But see Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975) (regarding duty
of disclosure on bank).
256. Glass-Steagall Act, ch. 89. 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.). See supra note 193 and infra note 260.
257. See supra text accompanying note 254.
258. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
259. Indemnification for securities law violations is not allowed in all circumstances and
may be limited by public policy considerations. See SEC Statement, 17 C.F.R. § 230.460; Globus
v. Law Research Service, Inc., 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir. 1971); Note, Indemnification of
Underwriters and § 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 72 YALE L. J. 406 (1963).
260. Presently banks may underwrite certain governmental securities. 12 U.S.C. § 24(7)
(1982). Banks also are beginning to engage in practices that are similar to underwriting but
which technically do not fall within the general prohibition against public underwritings by
banks. See, e.g., Federal Reserve System, Statement Concerning Applicability of the Glass-
Steagall Act to the Commercial Paper Placement Activities of Bankers Trust Company, FED.
BANKING L. REP. 86,270, at 90,823-37 (June 4, 1985) (discussing certain private placement
activities). See generally, Comment, supra note 193; Note, supra note 193.
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to gain the benefits of such underwriting-type practices, they must also accept
the potential liabilities. The laws and requirements applicable to traditional
underwriters will now also apply to banks. The attractiveness of banks as
deep-pocket defendants balanced by the public trust placed in the banking
industry, particularly by a bank's own depositors, indicate that banks must
exercise considerable caution in this area.
261
C. Hypothetical Situations
Two hypothetical debt financing alternatives for a business expansion
illustrate the potential concerns of the lender and present distinct securities
considerations. These are a loan directly from a bank or a public offering
of debt securities supported by a bank's letter of credit. In either scenario,
the bank absorbs the credit risk. The bank probably also treats each alter-
native similarly except for certain documentation. In assessing the potential
for liability as an alder and abettor of a securities law violation, however,
the two alternatives require separate analysis.
1. Loan
The bank has several basic considerations in avoiding aiding and abetting
liability in a standard loan transaction. The primary consideration is the
relationship of the proposed debt to the business' other debt and equity. For
example, the bank should consider whether the creation of debt violates any
provision of any charter, bylaws, shareholder agreement, partnership agree-
ment, trust indenture, loan document or other agreements of the obligor,
cosignor, guarantor or other related party and whether any securities viola-
tion in connection with any subordinated debt or equity has occurred. A
second consideration is the use of the proceeds of the loan. For example,
will the proceeds of the loan be used to commit any securities violation 262 or
to invest in a security in connection with which a violation has been
committed? A third consideration is the collateral for the loan. If a security
is pledged as collateral, has there been any violation with respect to that
security? These are only a few questions that must be asked in each loan
transaction. These questions also demonstrate the potential problems that varia-
tions in each transaction's facts and circumstances may raise.
2. Credit Enhancement
Debt financing supported by a bank's letter of credit is the second
financing alternative discussed above. The letter of credit itself is a security
which is exempt from registration under Section 3(a)(2) of the Securities Act
261. See Federal Reserve System, Statement Concerning Applicability of the Glass-Steagall
Act to the Commercial Paper Placement Activities of Bankers Trust Company, FED. BANKING
L. REP. 86,270, at 90,823-37 (June 4, 1985).
262. See supra notes 201-18 and accompanying text.
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if issued by a domestic bank.26 3 The security for which the letter is being issued
can be the basis for aiding and abetting liability despite the letter of credit's
exemption from registration requirements.2 6' Thus two layers of considera-
tions emerge. First, because the letter of credit is in effect a loan, the con-
siderations discussed above regarding loans are applicable. Second, any viola-
tion in connection with the underlying debt security may give rise to aiding
and abetting liability of the bank. The second layer of considerations dictates
that among other things the bank and its counsel examine the debt offering
for compliance with all securities laws.
IV. CONCLUSION
Banks and other financial institutions have increasingly faced lawsuits
alleging aiding and abetting various securities law violations. As deep pockets,
such institutions are natural targets of plaintiffs who have lost money and
are left with judgment-proof debtors as primary defendants when the invest-
ments turn sour. Notwithstanding this natural tendency, the courts must ex-
amine fully the allegations in accordance with the analytical model set forth
herein. Otherwise financial institutions may become insurers of the securities
market with no method to determine in advance the permissible parameters
in which to operate.
The economic realities of the marketplace must be observed. The Fifth
Circuit in the hallmark case of Woodward recognized these realities in
rejecting a liberal approach to aiding and abetting liability for financial
institutions. In most commercial banking transactions banks will not have
the scienter necessary for the imposition of liability. Woodward requires the
aider and abettor to have knowledge of the underlying violation as well as
knowledge that the assistance rendered is a facet of that violation. Some
courts, however, are slowly chiselling away at the Woodward doctrine
notwithstanding the Supreme Court's imposition of judicial restrictions in
the series of recent decisions discussed above.
Commercial reasonableness of bank's actions in transactions should be
important. This, of course, impacts upon the element of scienter. The
securities laws were never intended to provide a moral code of banking ethics
but as the banking industry branches further into the securities arena, the
industry must remember that the securities laws will affect it. Financial
institutions cannot hide behind a banking cloak to insulate themselves from
securities liability but commercial reasonableness and business justification
should be critical factors.
263. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1982). The "fraud" sections of the securities acts, however, still
apply to the letter of credit. The fraud sections of the securities acts include Sections 11, 15
U.S.C. § 77k (1982), 12, id. § 771 and 17, id. § 77q, of the Securities Act and Section 10, id.
§ 78j, of the Exchange Act.
264. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1982).
[Vol. 42:811
19851 AIDING AND ABETTING 851
The need for financial institutions to be able to determine in advance
the permissible parameters is paramount. Because one of the basic policies
underlying the allowance of private civil actions is deterrence, participants,
including secondary participants, in the securities markets must have some
framework within which to pattern their actions. The theory of an efficient
marketplace assumes knowledge of the legal rules within which each individ-
ual must operate. A failure to define clearly these legal rules not only results
in an inefficient marketplace but also allocates risks unfairly.

